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ABSTRACT This paper examines the concept of in loco parentis in the light of its legal
origins and considers its relevance to contemporary schooling, particularly the professional
responsibilities of teachers. It is argued that from a legal perspective, in loco parentis is
noiu largely an anachronism in Neio Zealand education, although it appears to have some
limited application in non-compulsory and out-of-school-hours educational activities.
From an ethical point of view, the concept remains useful because it stresses the duty of
care that professional teachers have towards their students. Hoivever, teachers need to be
clear about its extremely limited legal relevance as either a source of teacher authority or a
legal basis for teachers to attend to the health and luell-being of their students. In the main,
its oldßinctions have been superseded by much more specific legislation.
INTRODUCTION
The phrase in loco parentis has a familiar ring for most New Zealand primary and
secondary school teachers. Many understand it to be a legal description of an
important aspect of the expected professional relationship between them and their
pupils. Discussions with teachers suggest, however, that their understandings of
the concept are frequently vague and most show little specific appreciation of
either the basis of this common law doctrine or its implications for professional
practice. For example, in the 1980s, corporal punishment in schools was made
illegal. At that time, some teachers suggested that the change meant that they no
longer stood in loco parentis towards their pupils. This was because a change in the
law meant that teachers were no longer permitted to punish their students
physically, although the children's parents were still legally permitted to do so. A
few years later, however, the first edition of the New Zealand Educational
Institute (NZEI) Code of Practice (NZEI, 1993) used the term, implying that in loco
parentis continued to apply to teachers. Despite that, in a later edition (NZEI,
1998), the term ceased to be used. Even more recently, a local secondary school
principal publicly justified the provision to senior students of advice and access to
contraceptives via his school's health clinic. He adopted this position, regardless of
the points of view of the students' parents, believing that he stood in loco parentis
to the students. Occasional use of the term by the press also suggests that there is
some public expectation that teachers fulfil such a role. For example, in 1996, when
a public inquiry was conducted into a public accusation that a teacher in a
Hamilton primary school had abused children (Lunn, 1997), the Waikato Times
headed its leader "Loco parentis not an easy task" (Waikato Times, 1996). Such
evidence suggests that the status of in loco parentis is far from clear.
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IN LOCO PARENTIS AS A LEGAL PRINCIPLE
In loco parentis is a common law doctrine. The word doctrine has a number of
meanings, but in this context it denotes a tenet or principle. To say that it is a
common law doctrine means that the tenet or principle is derived from the
common or case law. In effect, a common law doctrine is a legal principle based on
past legal decisions rather than a specific law passed by parliament (Mulholland,
1995). Courts appear to turn to such principles for guidance in the absence of more
explicit legal injunctions (Harrison, 1996, p. 68).
The principle is derived from English law where the Oxford Dictionary of Law
(1997) notes that in loco parentis means "in place of a parent" and observes that the
term is "used loosely to describe anyone looking after children on behalf of the
parents, e.g. foster parents or relatives" (p. 234). More explicitly, Jowitfs
Dictionary of English Law ([owitt, 1977) says that:
A person is said to be in loco parentis towards an infant when he
assumes towards the infant the moral obligation of making such a
provision for him as his father would in duty be bound to make. The
assumption of the character may be, and generally is, implied from the
acts of the person putting himself in loco parentis, as where he pays for
the maintenance and education of the infant or establishes him in life.
The fact that the father of the child is living does not prevent another
person from putting himself in loco parentis, but if the child resides
with the father and is maintained by him it affords an inference,
although not a conclusive one, against the assumption of the character
by another person (p. 950).
The English legal precedents upon which the principle is based are from the
nineteenth century and the gendered nature of this definition reflects the
predominantly patriarchal social order of that time, a shortcoming that has been
corrected in the more recent Butterworths NZ Law Dictionary (Spiller, 2001),
although in essence the later definition remains more or less the same. Beyond
this, Jowitfs definition makes it clear that an adult enters such a relationship
electively, but that the relationship does not supersede the authority and
responsibilities of the parents.
While not commonly invoked, account has been taken of the principle of in
loco parentis in New Zealand in recent years. Two examples are a Family Court
judgement regarding an application for consent to the marriage of a minor, where
the court made its own inquiry and acted in loco parentis\ and a Complaints
Review Tribunal judgement against a racehorse trainer who had sexually harassed
and engaged in non-consensual sexual intercourse with a young female apprentice
jockey while he was considered to be in loco parentis towards her . These
applications indicate that the principle has potentially wide applications, and is
not specifically concerned with teachers.
In education, the doctrine was originally the basis for the authority of
teachers to discipline their pupils. Thus, Harrison (1996) notes, that the doctrine
originally:
. . . postulated a derivation of disciplinary authority on the part of a
school teacher from the "common law" disciplinary powers of the
student's parent or parents. Either explicitly or by implication, it was
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said, the parent had delegated his or her authority in relation to
discipline to the student's teacher, while under their care or control (p.
68).
There are two features of the principle, as explained by Harrison, that should be
noted. The first is that the delegated powers are not unlimited. Writers on the
topic, such as Breakwell (1993, p. 104) and Crook (1989, p. 447) cite the legal
authority of Blackstone's Commentaries on a father's authority:
He may also delegate part of the parental authority during his life to the
tutor or school master who is then in loco parentis and has such a portion
of the power of the parents committed to his charge (such as that of
restraint and correction) as may be necessary to answer the purposes
for which he is employed (p. 478).
This suggests that the powers delegated to the teacher are limited to those
necessary for the teacher to fulfil his or her teaching functions. Indeed, Crook
(1989, p. 447) is explicit on this point and interprets Blackstone as meaning that the
teachers' rights are no greater than those rights the parent has chosen to delegate.
Secondly, while the principle of in loco parentis conferred powers upon
teachers, especially the power to punish their students while under their control,
the same principle also imposed upon them a duty to take reasonable care for the
safety and well-being of those students. As in most other instances, the conferring
of power was accompanied by the imposition of obligations. Thus in an Australian
case. Judge Ferguson concluded that:
. . . the Crown must be regarded as having taken over in respect of
pupils the obligation to take reasonable care for their [the pupils'] safety
- an obligation which is to be measured by that care which a careful
father would take of his own children {Hole v Williams [1910] 10 SR
(NSW) 638, cited in Walsh, 1999, 22).
These features of the principle have been recognised by teacher organisations. For
example, the Teachers' Legal and Service Handbook of the NZEI (Ashbridge, 1959. p.
264-265)^ notes that:
The parent does not impliedly hand over all his rights and duties, but
only those that are necessary for the welfare of the child and in carrying
out those delegated duties, the teacher must not be negligent. A
schoolmaster (sic) is bound to take such care of his boys as a careful
father would take of his boys (pp. 264-265).
This handbook makes it clear that failure to provide the "reasonable care"
required of in loco parentis, could be the basis for a legal charge of negligence and
possibly a claim for damages. This is illustrated using several English precedents'*,
but no New Zealand case is cited. In this country, as Walsh (1999, p. 22) observes,
the case law in education tends to focus on the issue of corporal punishment,
which has now been abolished for 10 years.
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CONTEMPORARY LEGAL RELEVANCE
There are three reasons why the concept of in loco parentis appears problematic as a
legal principle in education in present-day New Zealand. Its relevance in a system
of compulsory education is questionable, as is its appropriateness in a
contemporary social context where students have rights separate from those of
their parents. There is also evidence that the fimctions of in loco parentis have been
largely superseded by other legislation.
(a) In a System of Compulsory Education
The relevance of in loco parentis in a contemporary system of compulsory
education is questionable. Crook (1989, p. 447) notes that the legal principle of in
loco parentis preceded the advent of compulsory education, pointing out that the
parental delegation of authority to teachers may be traced back at least as far as
the early Roman Empire, when a father would attend to the education of his sons,
frequenfly employing servants for the purpose (Bowen, 1975). The same practice
occurred in eighteenth and nineteenth century England when parental authority
(usually paternal) determined whether or not a child would be educated, and the
necessary authority was delegated to the teacher who might be a tutor in the home
or a school teacher (Boyd & King, 1972). It is not hard to relate Blackstone's
commentary on in loco parentis, cited earlier, to this kind of situation.
However, both Crook (1989, p. 47) and Harrison (1996, p. 68) point out that
the relationship between parents and teachers was radically changed by the
introduction of compulsory education via legislation such as the 1870 English
Elementary Education Act and the 1877 New Zealand Education Act. The legal
requirement for all children to be educated meant that most parents had to enrol
their children at schools because only a small proportion were able to either home-
school them acceptably or employ a private tutor for the purpose. As a result, the
powers of teachers in schools ceased to be delegated by parents. This made the
legal relevance of in loco parentis questionable because, as Crook (1989, p. 47) notes,
under the terms of the 1944 English Education Act, the obligations of local
education authorities (LEAs) to provide a system capable of educating all children
in their area was to the Minister of Education (representing the Crown), rather
than directly to the parents of those children. Thus, schools became primarily
answerable to the government via LEAs, and as Crook observes, a parent suing for
damages would sue for breach of a duty to the Crown rather than for breach of a
duty owed primarily to themselves.
Similarly, in New Zealand, the 1877 Education Act established a national
system of education within which the Education Boards later fulfilled some of the
functions of the English LEAs. As a result, the authority of schools and teachers
was derived from the Crown rather than directly from parents. The 1990 changes
to the administration of education placed each school under the governance of its
own board of trustees which became directly answerable to the Crown via the
Ministry of Education. However, that did not change the legal basis of teacher
authority.
Thus, while in loco parentis may have had legal relevance prior to the
establishment of compulsory education, the imposition by the Crown of a legal
requirement for all children to be educated changed the relationship between
parents and teachers. No longer do parents have the discretion to decide whether
or not they will delegate their authority to their children's teachers; nor do they
In Loco Parentis and the Professional Responsibilities of Teachers 121
have the right to independently determine the degree of authority available to
those teachers.
(b) In the Current Social Context of Education
The current social context of education also makes the relevance of in loco parentis
questionable. A significant feature of the very phrase is its paternalistic nature.
Traditionally, it was the basis of an agreement between parent and teacher about
the educational arrangements for a child, with no suggestion that the child should
have any say in those arrangements which, in Victorian times, were legally
regarded as stemming from "the natural jurisdiction of the father over his child
until the age of twenty-one". To ignore it "would really be to set aside the whole
course and order of nature and . . . disturb the very foundations of family life" {R v
Agar Ellis [1883J, cited in Crook, 1989, p. 448). Such a view appeared to tacitly
assume that parents would automatically act as the guardians of their children's
rights. However, from a contemporary point of view, as Crook (1989, p. 448)
observes, this 1883 view effectively denied children any rights because it treated
them as objects, rather than legal subjects with the independent right to legally
hold another to a duty.
In recent years, there have been moves to define and assert the rights of
minors. Manins (1997) points out that in New Zealand, relatively recent legislation
such as the 1993 Human Rights Act, the 1993 Privacy Act, the 1989 Children,
Young Persons and Their Families Act and the New Zealand Ratification of the
1993 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child all define and assert
the legal rights of minors independent of the rights of their parents. As a result,
there has been increasing interest in what is referred to as "youth justice" (Youth
Law Project, 1996) with clear implications for the rights of students in schools
(Rishworth, 1996). Such developments challenge the appropriateness of what
Crook (1989) described as the bilateral nature of arrangements based upon in loco
parentis which give the student no right of involvement. This shortcoming led
Crook to suggest that a trilateral model (involving parents, student and teacher)
was needed for account to be taken of the rights of students. This view is based on
the idea that students ought to have rights of self-determination, which might
conceivably conflict with the wishes of their parents, especially as students
approach majority. Thus, in 1986, the British House of Lords recognised the
"autonomy interest" of a minor when it upheld a doctor's discretion to give
contraceptive advice to a girl imder 16 without parental consent, provided she had
sufficient understanding and intelligence to fully comprehend that which was in
issue. As Crook (1989) observes, this decision has implications far beyond the
practice of medicine because it implies that majority, "rather than being suddenly
and completely acquired at 18 years of age will be acquired gradually, depending
on the child's ability to comprehend the ramifications of the particular issue under
consideration" (p. 449). In short, if students who have not reached the age of
majority are to have the rights of self-determination to the extent that they have
sufficient understanding and intelligence to fully comprehend that which is at
issue, then the bilateral nature of agreements based on in loco parentis alone are
demonstrably unjust.
(c) In the Light of Other Legislation
It may be argued that the legal functions of in loco parentis have now been largely
usurped by more recent and more explicit legislation. In 1996, Harrison observed
that there did not appear to be any modern legal cases in New Zealand education
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where the principle has been invoked (Harrison, 1996, p. 68). That is not
surprising. One obvious reason is that corporal punishment, which has been the
focus of New Zealand case law on in loco parentis (Walsh, 1999, p. 22) was legally
abolished in New Zealand schools in 1990. Jefferson (1994) notes that the original
provision in the 1961 Crimes Act,^  giving teachers the authority to use force by
way of correction stemmed from this principle.
Every parent or person in the place of a parent, and every schoolmaster,
is justified in using force by way of correction towards any child or
pupil under his care, if the force used is reasonable in the
circumstances. (1961 Crimes Act, 59[1]).
However, Section 139A of the 1990 Amendment to the 1989 Education Act
effectively banned the use of corporal punishment in registered schools and early
childhood centres. The legislation made clear that from July 1990 no person
employed by a board of trustees of a school, or the managers of a private school,
or the management of an early childhood centre:
. . . shall use force, by way of correction or punishment, towards any
student or child enrolled at or attending the school, institution or
centre, unless that person is a guardian of the student or child (1989
Education Act as amended by s28(l) 1990 Education Amendment Act
[1990 No 60]).
The same amendment also resulted in some re-wording of Section 59 of the 1961
Crimes Act, cited above, to say that:
Every parent of a child and, subject to subsection (3) of this section [our
emphasis], every person in the place of a parent of a child is justified in
using force by way of correction towards the child, if the force used is
reasonable in the circumstance. (1961 Crimes Act as amended by s28[2]
1990 Education Amendment Act [1990 No 60]).
The subsection (3), referred to, said that:
Nothing in subsection (1) of this section justifies the use of force
towards a child in contravention of Section 139A of the 1989 Education
Act (Crimes Act 1961 as amended by s28[2] 1990 Education
Amendment Act [1990 No 60]).
In other words, even if parents agree that teachers should use corporal
punishment to correct the behaviour of their children, from 1990 the law has
f^orbidden it, regardless of the fact that it remains legal for parents and others in
the place of parents to use reasonable physical force as a corrective measure.
Another reason for believing the principle to be legally superseded is that the
1990 Tomorroiu's Schools reform of educational administration in New Zealand, in
which the governance of schools was devolved from the Department of Education
to the local board of trustees of each school, made the board a body corporate which:
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May sue and be sued, and otherwise do and suffer everything bodies
corporate may do and suffer (1989 Education Act, Section 117, Sixth
Schedule [1])
This change was significant for teachers because it meant that the local boards of
trustees, rather than more remote government agencies (such as the by-then
defunct education boards or Department of Education) became accountable for the
ways in which students were treated. Thus, every school was required to develop
its own policies and procedures which had to meet the specific requirements of
such legislation as the 1992 Health, Safety and Employment Act, the 1990 New
Zealand Bill of Rights, the 1993 Privacy Act and the 1993 Human Rights Act. As
bodies corporate, boards of trustees now run the risk of being sued if they do not
comply with the legal requirements. At the same time, boards of trustees have
increasingly found it necessary to legally safeguard themselves against arbitrary
decisions on such matters as suspensions and expulsions by ensuring that the
rights of students to natural justice and other procedural principles are
maintained. The significance of these changes for the status of in loco parentis is
that a number of acts of parliament spell out the obligations of boards of trustees
towards their students as well as their employees. Thus, not only is the legal basis
of teacher authority enshrined in other legislation, but increasingly the obligation
for schools to exercise reasonable care of their students is spelled out explicitly and
is no longer reliant on the benign authority of teachers acting in loco parentis.
In this light, it is hardly surprising that recent commentators concluded that
the in loco parentis doctrine is now largely replaced by statutory authority, such as
the Education Act, which gives schools the right to control students (Walsh, 1999,
p. 23; Walsh & Bartley, 1999. p. 81). We would add that other legislation, which
binds school trustees as the employers of teachers and the providers of education
services, also safeguards the interests and well-being of students in schools.
Nevertheless, the legal principle still appears to have relevance in a limited
number of educational contexts outside compulsory education. Breakwell (1993)
claims that the doctrine of in loco parentis still provides what she calls "some
residual implied authority to teachers where the teacher/pupil relationship exists
but where it is not so clear that the school's authority extends" (pp. 105-106). Thus,
she concludes that the doctrine cannot be entirely dismissed and could still be
relevant in the pre-school, private school and out-of-school activity areas where
students participate only with the agreement of their parents. In particular, she
notes that there is still an element of authority delegated to teachers by parents
when students attend sports trips at weekends and overnight camps, and when
students are accommodated in school boarding hostels'. In these cases, it might be
argued that teachers have implied powers delegated by parents and they are,
therefore, more directly accountable to those parents than they are in other more
regular and compulsory activities.
This leads us to the conclusion that in the twenty-first century, in loco parentis
has significant shortcomings as a legal principle because it takes no account of the
rights of students to reasonable self-determination in their own education. We are
also of the view that generally it is no longer the source of authority for schools
and their teachers in a system of compulsory education. Nor has it been for some
time. In fact, the source of authority for schools and teachers is now largely
derived from legislation such as the same Education Act that requires parents to
have their children educated between ages six and 16 years. Moreover, schools are
legally bound to meet the requirements of other legislation that specifies where
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they must attend to the safety and well-being of their students. Nevertheless,
Jefferson's conclusion that from a legal point of view "in loco parentis may be
usefully consigned to the wastepaper bin" (Jefferson, 1994, p. 63) is questionable.
The common law doctrine still appears to have relevance to areas of non-
compulsory education, notably the pre-school sector, private schools and extra-
curricular activities.
CONCLUSIONS
Our investigation of the status of in loco parentis in teaching suggests that in the
days before the establishment of compulsory education, when parents decided
whether or not their offspring would be educated, those parents had the power to
contract someone to be the child's teacher. As a part of that implicit contract, some
of their parental powers were delegated to the teacher for him or her to facilitate
learning. Frequenfly at least, those powers included the power to punish students.
In return, the contract required the teacher to take reasonable care of the student.
Thus, the teacher who stood in loco parentis was both delegated limited parental
authority over a minor and obliged to take reasonable care of the pupil.
The establishment of compulsory education changed the relationship
between parents and teachers because the decision that children should attend
schools for the purposes of education was made by the state, rather than by the
parents of individual children. This meant that the powers of teachers were no
longer directly delegated by parents. Thus, since the late 1800s the extent to which
in loco parentis has been the source of teacher authority in New Zealand primary
schools is questionable. The authority of teachers over their students derived, and
continues to derive from the same legislation that requires those students to attend
schools.
That delegation of authority from state to teacher occurs via intermediary
bodies. Before 1990, these included the Department of Education, education
boards and the boards of governors of secondary schools, whose functions are
now fulfilled by boards of trustees. Initially, the intermediary bodies regulated the
powers of teachers^ through departmental regulations and Education Board by-
laws which usually delegated powers to teachers via head teachers. Since 1990, the
regulation of the authority of teachers continues via national policies and school
policies which must be approved by the school's board of trustees, even if they
were formulated by the professional staff.
Thus the legal doctrine of in loco parentis appears not to have been the legal
source of teacher authority since the establishment of compulsory education. And,
at the same time, as an Australian judge argued in 1910 "the Crown must be
regarded as having taken over in respect of the pupils the obligation to take
reasonable care for their safety - an obligation which is to be measured by that
care which a careful father would take of his own children" (Ferguson J. in Hole v
Williams [1910] 10 SR (NSW) 638, cited in Walsh, 1999 p. 22).
However, to agree with Walsh (1999, p. 23) "that in loco parentis has passed
its used-by date" is not to suggest either that teachers, as staff members of their
schools have less authority than they had in the past, or that they are no longer
required to be attentive to the well-being of their pupils and take reasonable care
of them. Rather it means that the source of their authority lies in other, more
explicit legislation, and that the obligations of schools and teachers is spelled out
in a variety of acts of parliament and may be tested using legal principles such as
natural justice and the law of negligence. Earlier, we noted that courts tend to turn
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to common law doctrines in the absence of other, more explicit legislation. In
effect, for most circumstances within education, other legislation now supersedes
the common law doctrine of in loco parentis.
What then do these conclusions suggest about the examples of apparent
popular confusion about in loco parentis by teachers and the wider public that were
cited at the beginning of this paper? Firstly, under circumstances where parents
are legally required to surrender their children to the care of relative strangers in
schools when those children are at a vulnerable age (Soder, 1990, p. 73), it is hardly
surprising that the phrase in loco parentis is sometimes latched onto by parents and
members of the public to describe the duty of care they expect of teachers.
However, when the phrase is used in this way, its use is metaphoric, rather than
legal. This also appears to be the basis of its use in the Waikato Times leader cited
earlier (Waikato Times, 1996).
Secondly, the change to the Education Act 1990, forbidding teachers to use
corporal punishment, and the 1990 education reforms which established a system
of self-managing boards of trustees, appear to have spurred legal reconsideration
of the relevance of in loco parentis to teaching. That re-consideration led to
somewhat belated recognition that generally, in loco parentis was not the source of
teacher authority. It is hardly accidental that most legal comments on the matter
post-date 1990 (Breakwell, 1993; Harrison, 1996; Jefferson, 1994; Rishworth, 1996;
Walsh, 1999) and coincide with an increasing interest in education law which has
accompanied the establishment of self-managing schools. In the wake of those
legal comments, the NZEI appears to have become increasingly cautious about
making legal reference to the doctrine, and that caution accounts for the
disappearance of reference to the doctrine from the NZEI Code of Practice
between 1993 and 1998 (NZEI, 1993; 1998).
Thirdly, in the light of our discussion, the suggestion that a secondary school
principal might provide senior students with advice and access to contraceptives
via his school's health clinic on the grounds that the principal stood in loco parentis
to those students appears to be without legal foundation. That is not to say that his
action was wrong and might not be justified on other grounds. However, the
doctrine of in loco parentis does not appear to be the source of such authority.
Regardless of the fact that the doctrine of in loco parentis may have only
limited legal relevance to teaching in schools, it is our view that it still has value as
an ethical metaphor for the roles of professional teachers. There is no doubt that
schools and teachers are obliged to fulfil some of the caring roles of parents for
their pupils and in loco parentis as a metaphor appears to express that relationship
rather welf. It emphasises the duty of care in teaching, the need for which has
been highlighted in recent years by writers such as Noddings (1986, 1992, 2000).
However, Katz (1980) draws attention to some important differences between
mothering and teaching, and it has also been argued (Hall, 2001) that there are
important differences to be discerned between the care of effective parents and the
ethical care which it is appropriate for professional teachers to exhibit. In other
words, for teachers to regard themselves as being metaphorically in loco parentis
still requires them to distinguish between teacher and parent roles. The
relationship between this metaphoric use of the phrase by teachers and the ethic of
professional care is a matter to be explored in a future paper.
If teachers use the term as a metaphor, it is important for them to distinguish
clearly between its use as a metaphor and its use as a common law doctrine. As a
common law doctrine applicable to teachers, it is now largely superseded by other
legislation and therefore is in the main an anachronism.
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NOTES
1 Buckland v Buckland, Family Court, New Plymouth, 24 November, 1988. File
FPN043/302/88.
2 Proceedings Commissioner v Laursen, Complaints Review Tribunal, 27 May
1996. File CRTlO/96.
3 This Statement was also repeated in the 7"" and latest edition of the Teachers'
Legal Handbook, published in 1965.
4 The cases cited were Jones v London County Council, concerning a permanent
injury to a child suffered in a compulsory rough game and Williams v Eady, in
which a teacher left a dangerous substance (phosphorus) where it was
accessible to a student who played with it and was burned and injured
(Ashbridge, 1959, pp. 266-267). In each case, the teacher was judged to have
been negligent.
5 The provision of the 1961 Crimes Act may be traced back to the 1993
Criminal Code Act which the Youth Law Review (2000) records "gave
statutory recognition to the long-established English conrtmon law principle
that parents and schoolteachers could use reasonable chastisement to correct
the behavior of children under their authority" (p. 7).
6 The case of M u Board of Trustees of Palmerston North Boys' High School (cited
Walsh and Barfley, 1999, pp. 40-42) illustrates how the principle may apply
in the context of a school boarding establishment. A boarder was caught on a
security camera stealing a wallet in a school boarding establishment. He was
interviewed by the Rector and dismissed from the boarding establishment,
although he was permitted to continue to attend the school as a day pupil.
The parents brought a legal action to have him reinstated as a boarder
because the Rector had interviewed him without the parents present, which
was a requirement of the school's policy for dealing with theft by students.
The court ruled that the boarding establishment was separate from the school
and that the boarding establishment was obliged to comply with the terms of
the separate boarding contract, which it had done, and was not obliged to
follow the school's policy regarding theft by students. The Rector was
considered entitled to act in loco parentis in his role as head of the boarding
establishment, without the parents present. Because the student was stiU able
to attend the school, the Education Act was not infringed.
7 For example, in the 1950s the South Auckland Education Board regulated
corporal punishment via its by-laws which delegated the power to punish to
"the Headteacher, or by an assistant in charge of the class with the
Headteacher's approval" with the proviso that the Headteacher did not have
the power to order any assistant to inflict punishment (Education Board of
South Auckland, 1955, p. 22). The by-laws stated that corporal punishment
"shall be reserved for deliberate breaches of discipUne and wilful faults" (p.
22) and made it clear that it should not be inflicted for such shortcomings as
trivial breaches of discipline, failure or inability to learn, or neglect to prepare
home lessons. The accepted form of punishment was to be with a leather
strap to the hands; other forms were expressly forbidden; and girls were not
to be subjected to corporal punishment unless under exceptional
circumstances, and then only at the hands of a woman teacher (p. 22).
8 Shaw (1995) speaks of teachers as being emotionally in loco parentis.
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